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Abstract: Prior studies show that the effect on earnings quality of female 
commissioner in many aspects of the company is inconsistent. Furthermore, previous 
studies focus only on the company with one-tier board governance. These two facts 
motivate us to investigate the role of female commissioner in improving earnings 
quality in the different background, especially in company with two-tier board 
governance. We also examine the role of president director’s ability to solve the 
inconsistent effect of a female commissioner. We exert a sample of 707 manufacturing 
companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2015. By using multiple 
regression analysis, we do not find that female commissioner, as well as president 
director’s ability, each positively affects earnings quality. However, we find positively 
significant results when these two variables interact. The finding that the interaction 
between the two variables is significant means that president director strengthens 
female commissioner in improving earnings quality.    
Keywords: female commissioner, managerial ability, earnings quality, Corporate 
Governance 
 
Intisari: Penelitian terdahulu menunjukkan ketidakkonsistenan pengaruh direktur 
wanita terhadap kualitas laba. Penelitian-penelitian terdahulu juga hanya berfokus 
pada perusahaan dengan tata kelola berupa one-tier board. Kedua argumen tersebut 
menjadi motivasi penelitian ini untuk menguji peran direktur wanita dalam latar 
belakang yang berbeda, khususnya perusahaan dengan tata kelola berupa two-tier 
board. Selanjutnya, penelitian ini menguji pengaruh kecakapan presiden direktur 
untuk menjelaskan ketidakkonsitenan peran direktur wanita tersebut. Kami 
menggunakan sampel sebanyak 707 perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar dalam 
Bursa Efek Indonesia selama periode 2011-2015. Berdasarkan analisis regresi linier 
banyak, kami tidak mendapati bukti empiris bahwa direktur wanita, sebagaimana 
presiden direktur, secara sendiri-sendiri berpengaruh secara positif terhadap kualitas 
laba. Namun, penelitian ini mendapati bukti empiris bahwa interaksi antara kedua 
variabel tersebut signifikan. Hal itu dapat diinterpretasikan bahwa presiden direktur 
mendukung komisaris wanita untuk meningkatkan kualitas laba.    
Kata kunci: komisioner wanita, kecakapan manajerial, kualitas laba ,tata kelola 
perusahaan
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – Jan, Vol. 21 , No.2 , 2018 
196 
 
1. Introduction 
 The purpose of this research is to examine the influence of female 
commissioner, president director’s ability and earnings quality. Many studies have 
already been conducted regarding the role of a female commissioner in the company 
performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), acquisitions (Levi et al., 2014; Dowling & 
Aribi, 2013; Huang & Kisgen, 2013), conservatism (Francis et al., 2005; Arun et al., 
2015), market response (Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Kang et al., 2010) and earnings 
quality (Srinidhi et al., 2011). However, those researches focus only on companies 
with one-tier board governance. Also, studies regarding the role of a female 
commissioner in the company remain inconsistent. 
Gul et al. (2011) findings show that female commissioner tends to have a high 
level of transparency regarding the company's earnings information. That result is 
supported by Abbott et al. (2012) which state that the existence of female 
commissioner is related to lowering chance of company to re-submitting financial 
report. Also, Srinidhi et al. (2011) succeed in documenting a high level of women 
participation as the board of directors will result in obtaining higher earnings quality. 
However, Srinidhi et al. (2011) argue the results of that examination could not be 
generalized in the countries with legislation, regulation and cultural institution that is 
different from United States (US). That argument motivates us to conduct similar 
research in Indonesia context. 
In previous research conducted by Firth et al. (2007), China is used as the sample 
due to its two tier-board governance is different from two-tier implemented in Europe 
Continental companies. Related to these arguments, Indonesia is worth to be the 
sample as it shares similar governance with China. Yet, a difference remains.  In 
China, most owners of public companies are dominated by the government (Firth et 
al., 2007), whereas in Indonesia it is dominated by family ownership (Claessens et al., 
2000). Claessens et al. (2000) state that since ownership company belongs to a family, 
there will be a strong separation between the controller parties and the owner parties 
compared to another type of governance. Therefore, Indonesia is assumed to be having 
stronger corporate governance than China. 
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Specifically, Indonesia provides unique backgrounds for female commissioner 
research. Kusumastuti et al. (2007) state that the community system in Indonesia still 
assumes that men are more capable of taking the critical role or higher position in the 
company compared to women. Having the argument, it would be interesting to explore 
the role of female commissioner that exists in the top-level management. 
Previous researchers document the inconsistent findings of the role of a female 
commissioner. Several types of research show that female commissioner has positive 
role (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Farrel & Hersch, 
2005; Arun et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2010; Srinidhi et al., 2011), yet the other research 
show the negative role (Farrel & Hersch, 2005; Hanani & Aryani, 2011). Even a study 
shows that they do not have any significant relation at all (Kusumastuti et al., 2007; 
Mardiyati, 2016). In a broad term, these researches have a similarity. They do not 
consider the specific managerial aspect. In another side, Bertrand & Schoar (2003) and 
Dejong & Ling (2013) state that managerial characteristics become the factor in 
determining the company practice and decision. Thus, our study examines a president 
director’s ability as the predictor of earnings quality. 
In measuring earnings quality, discretionary estimation error model developed by 
Francis et al. (2005) is used for this research. Then, the female commissioner was 
measured by a percentage of female assigned in board commissioners (Farag & 
Mallin, 2016). President director’s ability was examined by the General Ability Index 
(GAI) developed by Custodio et al. (2013). A statistical tool in the form of a multiple 
linear regression is used to test the hypothesis.  
According to our examination, we do not find evidence that female commissioner 
has positive impact on earnings quality. We do not find the effect on earnings quality 
of president director’s ability either. However, we find that the interaction of female 
commissioner and president director’s ability statistically, significantly affect earnings 
quality. This finding can be interpreted that president directors support the role of 
female commissioner in her efforts to improve earnings quality.  
Our study contributes to a practical and theoretical perspective. On the practical 
side, this research can be used as a consideration for regulators. Taking into account 
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Indonesia's unique characteristics, special regulations are required for the involvement 
of female members as a board of directors in the company. Also, most companies will 
employ high-ability presidential directors to organize them. Then, the existence of 
women directors will strengthen corporate governance, as they have a high tendency 
to increase supervision over management, including the president director. Therefore, 
the oversight by the female commissioner could encourage protection to investors, 
especially for a company in the weak shareholder protection country. 
From a theoretical perspective, the inconsistent role of female commissioner 
could be explained by the president director’s ability. Female commissioners tend to 
lose the oversight if they realize that the president director lacks capacity. On the other 
hand, when the president director has a high ability to run the company, female 
commissioners tend to strengthen her role as supervisor.  She wants to ensure that the 
president director uses their ability to improve the performance of the company and 
enrich the investor as the owner instead of using their knowledge for their interest. 
Despite its contribution, our study has some drawbacks that limit the conclusion. 
Firstly, the number of female commissioner in the company in manufacturing 
industries is relatively small. Secondly, the measurement of female commissioners 
does not consider a specific position of female commissioner in the board of 
commissioner. Thirdly, using the general ability index (GAI) in evaluating president 
director’s ability decreases the accuracy because this measurement could not cover the 
working experience in different industries. Fourth, the GAI is focused only on the 
ability of president director, as for president director has a low tendency to directly 
conduct accounting discretion. Lastly, our study uses only a cross-sectional analysis to 
identify the influence of the president director ability towards earnings quality. Aside 
from that, there would be a possibility to examine the impact if the observation held in 
the form of a time-series method. 
 
We organize our paper as follows. On the next part, we will discuss the 
hypothesis development alongside with literature review. After that we will elaborate 
research method consisting of sample selection and variables measurement. The 
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statistical result will be discussed afterwards and followed by conclusion, limitation 
and suggestion for the future research. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1   Agency Theory 
Many types of studies related to corporate governance underlie their argument 
with agency concepts (John & Senbet, 1998; Bushman & Smith, 2001; Upadhyay et 
al., 2014). The central idea of agency theory developed by Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
states that contractual relations exist between principals and agents. Agents are parties 
that are employed by principals to work for the interest of principals by obtaining 
delegation of authority for the decision-making process. However, conflict of interests 
between principals and agents may implicate the rise of supervision cost to control the 
agents. It happens since their work is to follow the principals' interest. 
Corporate governance is regarded as an exact mechanism to facilitate the 
stakeholder's interest in conducting supervision towards the internal side of company 
and management (John & Senbet, 1998; Upadhyay et al., 2014). John & Senbet (1998) 
view the role of supervision conducted by director become an essential component for 
governance since the shareholders have a limitation in supervising and controlling. In 
other words, corporate governance serves as a media to ensure the task of manager in 
conducting shareholders’ interest (Bushman & Smith, 2001). In addition, the 
controlling mechanism is necessary to become a segregating system between 
ownership and control (John & Senbet, 1998; Upadhyay et al., 2014). 
 
2.2  Corporate Governance 
 It is the director who plays the role of supervision in corporate governance 
(Bushman & Smith, 2001; Upadhyay et al., 2014). Adams & Ferreira (2007) assign 
board of directors as the highest legal authorities in company decision making. The 
manager sometimes makes a decision that contradicts with shareholders interest, and 
director becomes the mediator to resolve these differences by approving and pushing 
towards the change (Adams & Ferreira, 2007).  
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In general, there are two types of structure on the board of directors that consist 
of one-tier (unitary or sole board) and two-tier (dual board) (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). 
Adams & Ferreira (2007) discuss entirely regarding the one-tier and two-tier systems. 
In one-tier structure, advisory and supervision function are combined (Adams & 
Frreira, 2007). Besides, that system allows CEO duality, which enables president 
director to function as the executives (management) and as part of the board of 
directors  (Krause et al., 2014). There is a clear distinction between management board 
or board of director performance in operational sectors and supervisory board or board 
of commissioner, which mitigate the result on duality (Hermawan, 2011)1.  
 
2.3. Female commissioner 
Research by Dowling & Aribi (2013) show that there is a negative relationship 
between the existence of a female commissioner and some acquisitions, due to the 
lower overconfidence on women compared to men. Furthermore, Dowling & Aribi 
(2013) imply that low-level acquisition could be brought about by a psychological 
factor related to different risk taker preference in women and men. 
In general, Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008) argue that the supervision role of 
director depends on the involvement in qualifications, experiences, and contributions 
toward many things related to the director, level of share ownership in one company 
and payroll scheme applied. One of the aspects that can be assumed to increase 
supervision is the existence of a female commissioner as part of directors. Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera (2008) hope that with the presence of a female commissioner will 
increase the shareholders’ value as it is to broaden the perspective of other director 
members. Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008) view there is a positive relationship 
between the existence of a female commissioner and the company value. A female 
commissioner is considered to be able to affect the company’s value. 
                                                          
1 In the one-tier board, the term of board of director is party with supervision function to 
control the executive works. On the contrary, terms of the board of director in the two-tier 
board represent the management parties or executives as the parties that maintain the daily 
activities of a company, whereas board of commissioner has the same function as board of 
director in the one-tier board governance. 
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In a global perspective, Arun et al. (2015) reveal the issues related to increasing 
gender diversity on company's directors have already become world concerns. It can 
be proven by formal regulation that obligates women involvement in the board of 
directors in Swedish, Norwegian and Spanish companies (Gul et al., 2013). Also, 
European United (EU) commission approves to increase gender equality in non-
executives board structure in public companies at the year of 2020 (Farag & Mallin, 
2016). 
Adams & Ferreira (2009) suggest that, first, gender diversity on the board of 
directors have the significant impact on the director's input. The input is in the form of 
high-level involvement to solve company problems. Second, the female commissioner 
has substantial roles in company’s director governance. Third, Adams & Ferreira 
(2009) document that companies with bad performance have more diverse members of 
directors in gender. Specifically, the negative relationship can be explained by 
connecting it with the existence of female commissioner and will benefit the company 
with weak shareholder rights due to an increase of supervision that can increase the 
value of the company. On the contrary, with the increase of oversight applied in strong 
shareholder rights environment will result in the adverse effect on the company. 
Adams & Ferreira (2009) re-strengthen their results by stating that gender diversity 
among the board of director will create close supervision. However, when considering 
gender diversity as mandatory, it will damage the company that already has good 
governance due to the increase of oversight may lead to decreasing the productivity 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  
Furthermore, Farrel & Hersch (2005) find that gender diversity boards will result 
in a good company performance. In another side, results from event study show that 
there is no significant market response toward the female commissioner designation 
(Farrel & Hersch, 2005). Conversely, Kang et al. (2010) document that capital markets 
positively respond toward appointment of female commissioner as top-level 
management. These responses provide an insight of investor generally receptive 
toward designation of female commissioner and adjustment in expectation of future 
value (Kang et al., 2010). Following Gul et al. (2013), they comment that many 
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previous studies document ambiguous evidence. On the other hand, director diversity 
is able to push the performance with the increase of decision-making capacity. 
Moreover, this diversity will give impact in the declining of group performance due to 
the escalation of conflict among that group. The existence of female commissioner is 
expected to increase the transparency and encourage the information content that will 
implicate to share price (Gul et al., 2011).  
Based on the motivation regarding the issue of enhancing the gender equality in 
director level in the company, Arun et al. (2015) document that gender in the board of 
director can be proxied by the total amount of female commissioner as independent 
director and executives director, alongside with existence of women as Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) effect on the quality of financial reporting. The more women proportion 
as the board of directors will show conservatism in practice and policy. 
By using the setting sample on US public companies, Francis et al. (2015) 
strengthened Arun et al. (2015) by showing the difference in decision-making 
preferences between men and women. Systematic differences to be marked by 
conservative choice are reviewed by women sensitivity level towards high-level risk 
than men. Francis et al. (2015) explain the choice to examine regarding conservatism 
in accounting that will give the exact reflection towards manager’s behavior in dealing 
with risk. Furthermore, the results show that female commissioner has a high level of 
independence (Abbott et al., 2012). These implications provide an insight into gender 
diversity which enables to increase supervision rather than homogeneous members of 
director (Abbott et al., 2012). 
The research conducted by Srinidhi et al. (2011) test the connection between the 
female commissioner and earnings quality that will be used as the primary basis in 
conducting this research.  Srinidhi et al. (2011) develop a logical thinking about the 
role of a female commissioner such as the role of independent director. Srinidhi et al. 
(2011) propose the argument that with diversity resulting from director’s gender can 
be benefiting the company. Srinidhi et al. (2011) results show that the company 
consisting of the female commissioner will have a higher earnings quality by 
enhancing the supervision. The measurement of female commissioner reflects three 
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aspects, namely female as the member of the board of directors, the member of non-
executive directors, and the member of the audit committee.  
 
2.4. Managerial Ability 
 Bertrand & Schoar (2003) begin their research with the question “How much do 
individual managers matter for firm behavior and economic performances?” Our 
research is motivated by previous studies focusing only on the characteristics of the 
company, industry, or market to explain the company's behavior and performance. 
Most of those researches do not take into account the role of individual manager 
which potentially affects (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). Bertrand & Schoar (2003) show 
evidence that manager fixed effects become decision factor in determining a 
company's variable practices. Specifically, the individual manager plays a role in 
giving significant and economic impact toward the decision of acquisition or 
diversification, dividend policy, interest coverage and other cost decreasing policy 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). 
Next, Demerjian et al. (2012) propose a model in measuring managerial ability 
which is based on Data Development Analysis (DEA). It is usually used for measuring 
in industrial level; then it got the modification to be used in the firm level. Several 
components are used to measure managerial ability:  cost of inventory, general & 
administrative expense, fixed asset, operating lease, past R&D expenditure, and 
intangible asset (Demerjian et al., 2012). In this model, Demerjian et al. (2012) expect 
that higher managerial ability would ease them to understand the trend of technology 
and industry, more reliable in predicting the demand of the product, including 
investment in the higher amount of project and efficiency in controlling the employee 
than the unreliable manager. In short, the more capable the manager, the more 
efficient and effective the company is.  
Choi et al. (2015) analyzes the operational ability of CEO to explain the 
relationship between current accruals and future cash flow. CEO with high capacity 
will be effective and efficient in applying operational policy and able to provide 
reflective future cash flow in current accrual (Choi et al., 2015). By observing data 
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from the year of 2000 until 2011, Choi et al. (2015) find that accruals reflecting 
information regarding future cash flow in the case of the manager do have a high level 
of operational ability. Choi et al. (2015) claim that results could complement the 
measurement of managerial ability by Demerjian et al. (2012) by showing not only 
accuracy of judgment and estimation ability in mapping current accrual with future 
cash flow, but also the need of ability on arranging an efficient operational decision. 
Furthermore, Choi et al. (2015) strengthen the research of Bertrand & Schoar (2003) 
regarding specific characteristics of CEO (managerial) as an essential dimension in 
quality of earnings.  
Dejong & Ling (2013) focus on the impact of specific individual in accrual that 
could not be explained by the company's characteristics. The results show that 
individual manager significantly has a chance to influence the company’s policy and 
practice (Dejong & Ling, 2013). Specifically, the president director affects the accrual 
by using various policies in the company (Dejong & Ling, 2013).  
Another managerial ability measurement in the form of GAI is developed by 
Custodio et al. (2013). The GAI analysis is based on president director’s work 
experience in developing previous public companies. Custodio et al. (2013) claim the 
model is able to measure expertise and skills which can be transferred or moved from 
companies and industries embedded with the individual as president director. 
Measurement with GAI could be classified as managerial ability in generalist and 
specialist groups (Custodio et al., 2013). A president director is categorized as 
generalist if his or her GAI value is above the average and as specialist if his or her  
GAI value is below the average. (Custodio et al., 2013).  The high value of GAI 
possessed by president director is higher than that owned by president director in 
operating the company. Graham et al. (2013) are interested in understanding president 
director's behavior as the primary role in the company decision maker. Having 
surveyed, Graham et al. (2013) conclude that president director has a high tolerance to 
risk, more opportunist and has the significant relationship with company's 
characteristics.  
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According to the variety of managerial ability measurement, we employ GAI 
measurement by Custodio et al. (2013) on the rationale that this measurement captures 
the experience of management. On top of that, this measurement is strengthened by 
upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) which states executive’s cognitive 
and emotion are constructed during carrier experiences. Hambrick & Mason (1984) 
assume that executives who build carrier in only one organization would relatively 
have limited perspectives. Therefore, the GAI is expected to properly show the ability 
of president director. 
2.5. Earnings Quality 
 Financial accounting information is the product of accounting governance and 
external reporting system which is used to measure and publish the audit result in 
qualitative data related to the financial position and company performance (Bushman 
& Smith, 2001). Moreover, profit is one of the accounting information sources that 
have fundamental roles in determining share price or even evaluating and deciding 
executive compensations (Bushman & Smith, 2001). Therefore, the quality of 
appropriate profit becomes the basis to know the role of a company's governance. 
One of potential distortion that decreases the accounting system is the ability to 
reflect earnings reporting implementation error and earnings management (Dechow et 
al., 2010). Specifically, the accounting measurement system in accrual can be the 
proxy for earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010). This accrual decision is based on the 
company's policy or managerial discretion. DeFond (2010) completes the Dechow et 
al. (2010) research by adding several observations from earnings quality literature, 
abnormal accrual measurement as part of them. DeFond (2010) explain that there are 
only three models from many choices which can be used to measure accrual, namely  
Jones (1991), Dechow & Dichev (2002), and Francis et al. (2005) models.  
Accrual model proposed by Francis et al. (2005) is based on earnings quality 
from Dechow & Dichev (2002) with the submitted modification by McNichols (2002) 
to include revenue and property, plant and equipment components as explanatory 
variables. Then, Francis et al. (2005) research model is able to improve Dechow & 
Dichev (2002) model with the decomposition of accrual components on innate factors 
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and discretionary factors shown by accrual. Francis et al. (2005) assume that cash flow 
is the primitive elements evaluated by the investor. Therefore identification of accrual 
quality becomes a crucial factor in earnings quality. High-quality accrual shows 
information for investors regarding reflected earnings profit into cash flow.  
2.6. Hypothesis Development 
2.6.1. The relation between the female commissioner and earnings quality 
 Based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), there is a conflict of interest 
between shareholders as principals and managers as agents. To minimize the conflict, 
corporate governance mechanism ought to be established to supervise management 
performance (John & Senbet, 1998; Upadhyay et al., 2014).  One of this mechanism is 
controlled by the director (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Upadhyay et al., 2014). 
 Considering the weak shareholder rights system in Indonesia, female 
commissioner role as the form of diversity in top-level management can be beneficial 
for the company (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008) 
document that female commissioner affects the value of the company. Furthermore, 
Adams & Ferreira (2009) comment that a female commissioner has a high 
involvement in solving every problem in the company, including in governance and 
increasing supervision system. 
 Based on other perspectives, gender diversity in board of directors results on 
good company performance by the broader views and experiences (Farrel & Hersch, 
2005) also affects the quality of financial reporting (Arun et al., 2015). Also, female 
appointment as director of the company is positively responded by market (Kang et 
al., 2010). Contradicting with Kang et al. (2010), Farrel & Hersch (2005) show 
insignificant result between market responses with appointment of the female 
commissioner. Besides, Hanani & Aryani (2011) document that gender diversity on 
the board of commissioner negatively relates to company performance. Gul et al. 
(2013) argue that diversity in directors would give a chance for group conflict, that 
will decrease the performance. 
 According to various proxies for earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010), the 
existence of female commissioner increases earnings quality, reflected by lower-level 
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of restatement (Abbott et al., 2012). Moreover, the increased information content 
occur by the high level of transparency (Gul et al., 2011). In details, Srinidhi et al. 
(2011) and Abbott et al. (2012) explain that female commissioners tend to push 
effectiveness in supervising. A strict supervision of manager performance is able to 
increase the manager's accuracy and carefulness in decision-making, which implicates 
the correctness of accrual discretion. Therefore, female commissioner can be 
conjectured to have a positive impact toward earnings quality. We propose hypothesis 
1 (H1) as follows. 
H1: Female commissioner positively affects earnings quality. 
 
2.6.2. The relation between president director’s ability and earnings quality 
 Bertrand & Schoar (2003) and Dejong &Ling (2013) explain managerial specific 
characteristics as the determinant factor in every company practical variables. 
Specifically, managerial characteristics reflecting managerial ability positively impact 
the company. Demerjian et al. (2012) argue that capable manager produces higher 
revenue in specific resources or even minimize the use of resources to achieve the 
particular target in revenue. Choi et al. (2015) show that managerial ability is of the 
essential contents in earnings quality.   
 In their research, Demerjian et al. (2013) relate managerial ability to earnings 
quality and find that managerial capacity increases earnings quality. Also, Choi et al. 
(2015) show that management ability in handling operational activities become a 
determinant factor in current accrual information for future cash flow. Furthermore, 
Demerjian et al. (2013) comment the accruals reported by capable managers reflect the 
real condition because the accruals are determined by correct judgment and 
estimation. Then, a competent manager with work experience in many company 
sectors and industries is expected to solve a complex problem (Custodio et al., 2013). 
According to the experience they have, president director as the chief of the executive 
(management) will take the decision correctly so that the accruals decision will reflect 
the real condition of the company. Thus, president director’s ability can be expected to 
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have a positive effect on earnings quality. Based on the above arguments, we advance 
the following hypothesis. 
H2:  High president director’s ability has a positive influence on earnings quality. 
 
2.6.3. The relation of  female commissioner and president director’s ability to 
earnings quality 
  
 Previous studies that relate female's role to board of directors provide inconsistent 
results. Some studies show that female commissioner has a positive role (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008; Farrel & Hersch, 2005; Arun et al., 
2015, Kang et al., 2010; Srinidhi et al., 2013) and some others show a negative role 
(Farrel & Hersch, 2005; Hanani & Aryani, 2011) and still remaining others show no 
influence of female commissioner (Kusumastuti et al., 2007; Mardiyati, 2016). 
Overall, those studies do not take into account specific managerial aspects in the 
analysis. 
 Some studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Abbott et al. 2012) 
show that the existence of female commissioners improves supervision. Because of 
their ability, president director tends to be motivated to take a decision (Mishra, 2014). 
Besides, capable president directors tend to have high tolerance towards risk and to act 
opportunistically (Graham et al., 2013). With consideration toward those possibilities, 
female commissioners with high-level of conservatism (Francis et al., 2015; Arun et 
al., 2015) and tend to avoid risky decision (Dowling & Aribi, 2013; Francis et al., 
2015) will increase their supervision. 
 This supervision function will be strengthened when the supervising president 
directors have a highly excellent ability to maintain the company. Conversely, lower 
ability president director tends to dilute the female commissioner's control.  The 
supervision is used to ensure that the policy established by president director can be 
aligned with the investor's interests instead of their own interests. On the other hand, 
when female commissioners assume that the managing director has a low ability, they 
will conduct loose oversight because it is easier for them to control and investigate in 
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case of a violation. Therefore, the high capability of the president director can enhance 
the role of female commissioners who ultimately implicated in the generation of high 
earnings quality. 
H3: The president director's ability strengthens the role of female commissioner 
towards earnings quality. 
 
To clearly and concisely explain the relationship between variables, exhibit 1 
shows the research framework we propose.  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Exhibit 1  
Research Framework 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
                     H1 (+) 
 
                                                  H3 (+) 
                                                                               H2 (+) 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1    Sample Selection 
 The sample selection is based on non-profitability sampling method in the form 
of purposive sampling. Several criteria become the bases for sample selection as 
shown in Table 1.   
Table 1  
Sample Selection 
 
Female Director 
Managerial Ability 
Earnings Quality 
Managerial Ability 
Female Director 
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Criteria Number of 
Companies 
Manufacturing companies listed on IDX in the year of 2011-2015 875 
(-) Companies conducting mergers and acquisitions (34) 
(-) Companies with incomplete data (134) 
Total 707 
Source of Data: BvD Osiris and Bloomberg 
 
The sample of this research is focused on manufacturing company since it has 
domination in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. So, by using this sector, it can show the 
characteristics of overall companies in the capital market and strengthen the ability to 
generalize the results. The determination of observation period starting from 2011 
until 2015 is based on the statement of Francis et al. (2005). In their research, Francis 
et al. (2005) state that the examination needs seven-year observation to include the 
calculation of cash flow on  previous years and cash flow in one-year ahead to analyze 
the residual of accruals. The data of cash flow on previous year are taken from 
company financial report of the year 2010, whereas data cash flow in one year ahead 
taken from financial report of the year 2016. Besides, the year 2010 is determined as 
the beginning period to avoid the effect of the global economic crisis data that 
occurred during 2008-2009. If these data during the crisis periods were used in the 
analysis, it might distort the result of this research. 
3.2. Variable Measurements 
Some identification of analysis method is used to test the relation between female 
commissioner, president director ability, and earnings quality. 
a. Female commissioner 
Female commissioner measurement is based on the total percentage of female 
members assigned as the board of commissioners (Farag & Mallin, 2016). The 
total of directors data could be obtained from the company's annual report that 
can be accessed through the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) official website. 
b. President director’s ability 
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 General Ability Index (GAI) developed by Custodio et al. (2013) is used to 
measure president director ability, which is the measurement that covers overall 
work experience of president director in public companies before the current 
position. Custodio et al. (2013) construct five components in measuring GAI, 
which are (1) a number of positions, (2) a number of firms, (3) a number of 
industries, (4) CEO experience dummy, and (5) conglomerate experience 
dummy. The data of each component can be gathered from financial reporting, 
especially at the part of a biography of president director. After that, these five 
components are composed using principal component analysis (PCA). This 
analysis is usually used to classify each of the components that has relation to 
one factor. Because of that, the multicollinearity problem can be minimized. 
 The PCA will classify the components as two factors, which are a factor I that 
consists of component numbers 2 and 4, whereas factor II consists of component 
numbers 3 and 5. Component number 1 is eliminated because it generates the 
insufficient result as the requirements of PCA. Afterward, each factor will 
generate the particular number, and its number will be summed up to gather the 
amount of president director ability. The higher number of the result show the 
higher capacity of president director.  
c. Earnings quality 
Earnings quality measurement is based on discretionary estimation error 
model adopted from Francis et al. (2005). This model is a combination of 
Dechow and Dichev model (2002), modified Jones model, and McNichols's 
proposed model. Here is the formula: 
 
TCAi,t= 𝛼0,i + 𝛼1,i CFOi,t-1 + 𝛼2,i CFO i,t + 𝛼3,i CFO i,t+1+ 𝛼4,i ΔRev i,t + 𝛼5,i PPE i,t + εi,t 
 
 For the first step, Francis et al. (2005) use this formula to examine each of 48 
industry group. This calculation will generate the residual (error) which 
represents the accrual quality. The higher this accrual amounts, the lower the 
quality of earnings. The accrual number consists of innate and discretionary 
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factors. To distinguish between the innate and discretionary factors, Francis et al. 
(2005) hold second step of examination. So that, Francis et al. (2005) are be able 
to obtain the specific error that was caused by the managerial and error that 
cannot be controlled by the firm. The second step can be held only if there is 
some group of a sample that will be tested. For the current research, the 
examination is only held for the first because only one industry is used as the 
sample, which is manufacturing companies. Consequently, the data of this 
research does not meet the requirement of the second step examination. 
a. Hypothesis Testing 
Multiple Regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis with the function (1) as it 
follows: 
EarnQuali,t = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 FemDiri,t + 𝛼2 PresAbltyi,t + 𝛼3 FemDir,t *PresAbltyi,t + 𝛼4 
Leveragei,t + 𝛼5 Sizei,t + 𝜀i,t 
Where; 
EarnQuali,t : Earnings quality measured by the accrual model 
proposed by Francis et al. (2005) 
FemDiri,t : Female commissioner measured by the total percentage 
of female members in commissioners (Farag & Mallin, 
2016) 
PresAbltyi,t : Managerial ability measured by the General Ability 
Index (GAI) (Custodio et al., 2013) 
FemDir,t *PresAbltyi,t : An interaction between female commissioners with 
managerial ability in company i at the year of t 
Leverage,t : A total amount of liability toward the amount of total 
asset in company i at the year of t 
Sizei,t : Company size measured by log of the total asset in the 
company i  at the year of t 
𝜀i,t : Error 
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This examination only uses two control variables – leverage and size – which are 
commonly used and already proved by many studies about its influence towards 
earnings quality. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Descriptive Statistic 
Table 2 presents descriptive of our data. Following the data description, we analyze in 
detail female commissioner and president director’s ability.  
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Maximum Minimum Mean Mode 
Mode 
Frequencies 
Correlation 
Earnings Quality 2.85 0 0.09 0.02 72 1 
Female 
commissioner 
0.80 0 0.11 0 466 0.045 
President Director 
Ability 
8.56 -1.02 -0.03 -1.02 193 0.001 
Female 
commissioner*Pre
sident Director 
Ability 
1.70 -0.68 -0.03 0 466 0.020 
Leverage 4.98 0 0.56 0.67 18 0.415* 
Company Size 7.28 2.34 5.12 5.37 11 0.085* 
 
*Pearson correlation test with a level of significance of 5% 
 
This research uses six variables, which consist of one dependent variable and five 
independent variables. Earnings quality becomes the dependent variable, whereas 
female commissioner, president director ability, the interaction between the female 
commissioner and president director ability are independent variables. The remaining 
variables, leverage and company size, are used as control variables. 
In earnings quality, maximum value reaching 2.85, as for minimum is 0. The 
result of earnings quality calculation is positive, negative and also zero. The 
measurement of earnings quality is usually used in the earnings management. When 
calculating the earnings management, the result is processed to be an absolute number 
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because the purpose is to investigate the existence of distortion instead of examining 
how the way to do the earnings management which is represented by the positive or 
negative sign at the result. Adopting that treatment, this research also calculates the 
earnings quality as the absolute number. Because of that, the minimum amount of 
earnings quality is zero. Average of earnings quality is 0.09, and the mode is 0.02 with 
the frequency of 72 times. Of the 707 companies, 72 companies had earnings quality 
in the amount of 0.02. 
Female commissioner is measured by women percentage in the board of 
commissioners. The highest percentage of the female commissioner is 0.80 and 
minimum is 0. The minimum value also becomes the mode with frequencies of 466 
times. That means that out of 707 companies, 466 companies do not have a female 
commissioner. The correlation value between the female commissioner and earnings 
quality show Pearson values of 0.045 with a probability value of more than 0.05. The 
results indicate the chance of none significant relation between percentage of the 
female president director and earnings quality.  
The next variable which is president director ability has a maximum value of 8.56 
with the minimum of -1.02, as the average is 0. That means there is president director 
(CEO) with the highest ability of 8.56, as one with the lowest value of -1.02. The 
lowest value can be categorized as the mode with frequencies of 193 times. That gives 
a sign that from 707 president directors, 193 among them have the lowest ability. 
Moreover, the average of president director ability is 0. The correlation value between 
president director ability and earnings quality is 0,001 which more significant than 
0.05. That value indicates that there is no connected relation between president 
director ability and earnings quality in hypothesis testing. 
Moderating variable in the form of interaction between the female commissioner 
and president director ability shows maximum of 1.70 and minimum of -0.68. That 
shows the company with a female commissioner, and president director’s ability has 
the maximum value of 1.70, and there is the company with the value of -0.68. On 
average, the company with a female commissioner and president director ability has 
the value of -.03. The value of mode is 0 with the frequency of 466 times. The same 
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other two variables, a correlation value between the female commissioner ability and 
president director ability has the level of significance more than 0.05 with Pearson 
value of 0.020. That value refers to the weak relationship between those interactions 
with the company's quality of earnings. 
Leverage as the variable control with the maximum value of 4.98 and minimum 
of 0. The result shows that there is a company with the highest leverage of 4.98 and 
there is a company with no leverage. For average, 707 sample firms give the average 
leverage of 0.56. The mode is 0.67 with frequencies of 18 times. That means, there are 
18 companies with the leverage of 0.67. Next, the slope of leverage is 4.59 with 
kurtosis of 31.16. Different from other previous variable correlation, leverage and 
earnings quality correlation has less significance from 0.05 with the correlation of 
0.415. This shows a strong relationship between leverage and company earnings 
quality. 
The second control variable, company size, is measured by total asset amount. 
The maximum value of company size is 7.28, and the minimum amount is 2.34. The 
average of sampled company size is 5.12. Company size of 5.37 becomes mode with 
the frequency of 11 times. The same as the leverage, company size has a correlation 
value of 0.085 with significantly less than 0.05. That indicates that company size has a 
strong relationship with earnings quality. 
 
Based on Table 3 below, the overall amount of directors are 2,862 directors that 
consist of 2.573 male directors and 289 female commissioners. According to that 
amount, the total of female commissioners constitutes only 10% of the overall amount 
of directors 
Table 3  
Amount of Female commissioners 
Explanation Total Percentage 
Board of Directors 
Female commissioners 
Male Directors 
2,862 
 289 
2,573 
100% 
10% 
90% 
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4.2. Measuring President Director’s Ability 
 General Ability Index (GAI) developed by Custodio et al. (2013) is used to 
measure managerial ability. The range of measurement consists of president director's 
(CEO) work experience in different companies and industries in the form of five 
variables.  
Table 4  
Communalities Value 
 
Variables Communalities Value 
X1 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
0.261 
0.658 
0.669 
0.744 
0.623 
  
 Based on Table 4, the amount of X1 is only 0.261, whereas Hair et al. (2010) 
state that for PCA examination, each variable has to earn communalities values of 
0.50. Therefore, X1 is eliminated from the analysis. GAI result with using PCA 
analysis is shown in Table 5. There are two factors established, which are the factor I 
and factor II. Factor I consist of X2 and X4, as for factor II include of X3 and X5. The 
variables X2 and X4 tend to measure president director ability in company level, as for 
X3 and X5 measure the ability in industrial level. Therefore, the established factor can 
recognize as ability in company and factor as ability in the industry.  
Table 5.  
Matrix Rotation Components 
 
 
Variables 
Components 
1 2 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
0.808 
0.319 
0.841 
-0.088 
-0.183 
0.778 
-0.015 
0.882 
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a. Hypothesis Results 
During classic assumption testing, several recovery steps are conducted due to 
heteroscedasticity problem. First, dependent variables are transformed. 
Transformation affects sample reduction from 707 to 668 samples. Then, there was 
heteroscedasticity problem in leverage variable, making it excluded from research 
model. With the overall fulfillment of classic assumption testing (normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation), hypothesis testing can be 
done with a regression test. Table 6 presents the results of hypotheses testing.  
Table 6.  
Regression Results 
 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistics Prob(t-value ≤)  
0 
Female commissioner 
President Director Ability 
Female commissioner* President Director 
Ability 
Company Size 
-1.609 
-0.354 
-0.004 
0.334 
-0.241 
-5.607 
-1.642 
-0.143 
1.748 
-4.360 
0.0000 
0.0505 
0.4430 
0.0405 
0.0000 
 
 
 
 
Based on Table 6, it can be formulated with the following function: 
Earnings Quality = -1.609 – 0.354 Female commissioner – 0.004 President 
Director Ability + 0.334 Female commissioner* President 
Director Ability – 0.241 Company Size 
Our conjecture is that the coefficient of female commissioner has a positive 
sign. We, however, find that the coefficient is -0.354 with the one-tail probability 
value of slightly more than 0.05. The negative sign of the coefficient shows that we 
fail to find that female commissioner has a positive impact on earnings quality. We 
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also predict that president director’s ability positively affects the earnings quality. 
Although we find that the coefficient has a positive sign, its probability value is more 
than 40 percent. The t value indicates that we do not find the effect on earnings quality 
of president director’s ability. We, however, find that the coefficient of interaction of 
female commissioner and president director’s ability is 0.334 and significant with the 
probability value of 0.0405. Thus, the interaction between these two variable 
statistically, significantly impacts on earnings quality. Next, the coefficient of control 
variable, company size, is negative 0.241 with the probability value of 0.000.  
 
b. DISCUSSION 
The fact that we do not find the positive effect on earnings quality of female 
commissioner needs explanation. In our opinion, the following arguments explain our 
failing to support our hypothesis 1. In the cultural perspective, Indonesian strongly 
assume that men are more eligible to get assigned an important position in the 
company rather than women (Kusumastuti et al., 2007). This implicates towards less 
number of women employed in the board of directors. Referring to descriptive data, 
from the total of 2,862 boards of directors, only 289 were female commissioners. 
Srinidhi et al. (2011) and Abbott et al. (2012) comment that female commissioner is 
able to increase the supervision, but with less number of a female commissioner, the 
optimal oversight could not be conducted, which results in management still freely use 
their  discretion and judgment for getting profit, without increasing cautious and 
estimation accuracy. With that being said, the female commissioner by her own may 
not have strong association with company earnings quality. 
 In the second hypothesis, we predict that president director’s ability has a positive 
influence towards earnings quality. Table 6, however, shows the probability value of 
0.4403 although the coefficient shows positive sign. Therefore, H2 is not supported. 
This result is different from Demerjian et al. (2013) or even Francis et al. (2008) 
results. Demerjian et al. (2013) document a positive relationship between managerial 
ability and earnings quality. In another side, Francis et al. (2008) state that managerial 
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ability, could be measured in president director’s reputation, negatively relates to 
company's quality of earnings. 
President director‘s work experiences in every company and industries could not 
ensure high quality of company earnings. Dejong & Ling (2013) state that even 
president director has the same impact as CFO in accrual accounting, total and 
abnormal accrual, but CFO tend to have a significant effect toward abnormal accrual 
rather than president director. Dejong & Ling (2013) add that to affect accrual, CFO 
uses choice (discretion) accounting, as for president director tend to use the company's 
policy. 
In other side, earnings mean the value comes from management discretion toward 
accounting numbers. That means, even president director with high ability is unable to 
affect earnings quality because he or she does not use accounting discretion. 
Therefore, capable president director will not have a connection with earnings quality. 
  Hypothesis three covers up the interaction between the president director’s 
ability and female commissioner towards earnings quality. The interaction of female 
commissioner and president director ability has a positive coefficient with the 
probability value of 0.0405. This means that the interaction between female 
commissioner and president director has a positive effect on earnings quality.  
President director with good ability tends to take a decision based on its own 
interest, instead of shareholders interest. Furthermore, Graham et al. (2013) state that 
president director has a higher tolerance for risk and opportunistic behavior. In another 
side, Francis et al. (2015) and Arun et al. (2015) comment that female commissioner 
tends to have a high conservatism. Dowling & Aribi (2013) and Francis et al. (2015) 
add that female commissioner tends to avoid a risky decision.  
With consideration of different tendencies between a female commissioner and 
president director, the female commissioner will play her function as a strict 
supervisor to ensure that president director will do his role based on shareholder 
interest. The existence of supervision encourages the managerial side to increase their 
cautious in estimation and decision-making, to achieve a good quality of earnings. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the interaction of female commissioner and 
president director ability has a positive influence on earnings quality of the company. 
Related to control variable, company size has a significance value on 0.000 with a 
coefficient of -0.241. Although the coefficient shows a negative sign, the 
interpretation is that company size has a negative relationship with the earnings 
quality. This is because the measurement of earnings quality is measured by the 
amount of accruals. Higher amount of the accruals reflects lower the level of earnings 
quality. Because of that, even the coefficient shows the negative amount, and it can be 
interpreted that company size has a positive influence toward earnings quality. Bigger 
companies show lower accruals. Lower accruals reflect more quality of earnings.  So, 
the bigger the company, the more quality is the earnings. Once a company makes a 
violation, the stakeholders will lose the trust that implicates the damage of company 
reputation. Because of that, bigger company has strong encouragement to present their 
condition faithfulness, especially reporting their income as the performance 
measurement. 
 
5. Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
 The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship of a female 
commissioner, president director’s ability, and earnings quality. We use agency theory 
by Jensen & Meckling (1976) which explores contractual relationship between 
principals and agents. On that relation, conflict of interest appeared that affects 
towards supervision cost appeared for controlling the agents to conduct based on 
principals interest. In the corporate governance system, the supervision mechanism is 
held by the director. The existence of a female in the board of directors is expected to 
give positive influence toward earnings quality. Srinidhi et al. (2011) and Abott et al. 
(2012) state that female commissioner efficiently improve the effective supervision.  
 Based on statistical testing, we find the followings. First, there is no sufficient 
empirical evidence that female commissioner has a positive impact on earnings 
quality. Second, there is no enough evidence that president director’s ability positively 
impacts towards earnings quality. Third, there is enough empirical evidence that the 
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interaction between female commissioner and president director’s ability has a 
positive impact on earnings quality. With these findings, it can be concluded that a 
female commissioner will do her function optimally as the supervisor when president 
director she oversees has the good ability.  
 Our study has some the following limitations. First, variable measurement for 
female commissioner is based on the total percentage of the female member of the 
board of commissioners without concern about position level in that board of 
commissioners. Future research should add different weight on the position of female 
commissioner, for example, female commissioner is assigned as commissioner 
president give higher weight rather than normal commissioner position.  
 Second, our research uses new measurement to examine managerial ability, 
which is the General Ability Index (GAI) developed by Custodio et al. (2013). This 
measurement is unable to describe the ability of president director correctly, especially 
work experience in various industries. The GAI determines us to measure the 
managerial ability by working experience in the industry and conglomerate firms that 
is only determined based on SIC code. The code is owned only by the public 
company. In fact, president director's work experience is actually not only in public 
company. 
 Third, GAI measurement covers up managerial ability owned by president 
director (CEO), according to Dejong & Ling (2013), CEO has a relatively small role 
in using accounting discretion. Therefore, subsequent research should use other 
measurements, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) developed by Demerjian et 
al. (2013) to measure the connection between managerial ability and earnings quality. 
 Fourth, rRelated to managerial ability, longitudinal or time-series analysis can be 
conducted to know the role of capable CEO in the company. Due to the probability of 
the CEO role will be seen in long-term company performance. 
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